I've made something of a habit of interacting with books that review the philosophy of Gordon Clark (e.g. link, link). Most recently, I came across one such book by Anthony Flood called Philosophy after Christ: Thinking God's Thoughts after Him. The author spends chapters 9 ("Gordon's Clark's Problematic Rationalism") and 10 ("What Are We Doing When We're Reading? Questions about Gordon Clark's Occasionalism") outlining and critiquing Clark's view on certain topics.
The author describes himself as having been a Clarkian in the 1980s and as having debated with John Robbins. It is hard to recall, but I think I came across a few articles of his involving Brand Blanshard and Joseph P. Farrell in the early 2010s. In any case, what follows will be a review of his ninth chapter, entitled, "Gordon's Clark's Problematic Rationalism."
The ostensible purpose of chapter 9 is to contrast Clark's apologetic to that of Van Til, Bahnsen, et al. Mr. Flood states that the "first [apologetic?] question" for Clark was, "how do you know?" Mr. Flood cites an article on John Robbins at this point, but a better background would be Clark's own thoughts on the subject. Take two examples:
PHILOSOPHY (φιλοσοφια, etymologically, love of wisdom). Traditionally the study of logic, the basic principles of science, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. In a wider sense, the general principles of any subject can be called its philosophy. Approaching a misuse of the word, the philosophy or education means merely the policy of school administration; and a “philosophy of life” designates any individual's preferences, no matter how poorly systematized. Inspired though it be, Ecclesiastes (q.v.) is an example of this popular meaning and has little to do with the subject matter of professional technical philosophy.
The reason for these shades of meaning is that philosophizing is generalizing, and no authority can fix the degree of generalizing necessary to merit the name.
The meaning of the word in Colossians 2:8 is hard to determine. It could possibly refer to Gnosticism or, perhaps, mean only ethics, for in the 1st cent., the Gr. Schools had sunk to their nadir and discussed little else.
The common element in all generalizations is a claim to knowledge. Therefore the crucial question of philosophy is—How is knowledge possible? Attempts to justify knowledge are called epistemology.
1981. What is Apologetics? The Gordon-Conwell Lectures on Apologetics.Metaphysics, the theory of being (not the beings of plants or botany, not the being of animals or zoology, no even the being of inanimate matter, but of being without qualification—being as such), is sometimes said to be the basic subject; but even Thomism, which makes such a claim, stands or falls with its theory of learning. The answer to the question—What do you know?—provokes the further question—How do you know? Beyond this, no question can be asked. Therefore, epistemology is the basis of philosophy.
The foundation of a strategy to meet all objections against Christianity is definitely technical. It is not a matter of ordinary, everyday conversation. Let me illustrate.On a very superficial level, yet indeed a lively, contemporary controversy among professing Christians, is the question of speaking in tongues. One side says that those who have never had the experience cannot judge of the matter. The other side says that experience is not the criterion; we must rather judge experience by the Bible. Beyond the range of professing Christians, David Hume rejected miracles and, in particular, Christ’s resurrection on the basis of experience. Schleiermacher, early last century, initiated modernism by insisting that all doctrines must be tested by experience.This raises the fundamental problem of apologetics. When one says, “I believe in the resurrection” or “I believe in tongues” or even “I believe in God,” the non-Christian will ask “how do you know?” This is true in physics and geology also. If someone asserts a law of physics or proposes a geological explanation of Yosemite, his colleagues will ask “how do you know?” They want to examine his methods. They want to see his criteria for knowledge. Theories concerning the criteria for knowledge are, in technical language, called epistemology. When a scientist or an historian asserts that he knows something, his statement is not acceptable unless he explains how he came to know it. “How do you know?” is the last question to be asked and epistemology is the first subject to be established.
With this background in mind, these examples preemptively answer a few later questions by Mr. Flood:
Clark scholar and biographer Douglas Douma writes that Clark's 'apologetic methodology flowed from his theory of knowledge.' But is that the right order? Does Scripture indicate it? One's apologetic methodology ought to comport with one's anthropology. In the Bible, I do not find and affirmation of the primacy or priority of epistemology. Insistence on the latter betrays a philosophy according to the rudiments of this world (Colossians 2:8).
Firstly, the above is a false dichotomy. One can hold that apologetics flows from one's epistemology and one's metaphysic (anthropology). Second, it is quite ironic that Mr. Flood's second question - "...is that the right order? Does Scripture indicate it?" - is precisely what Clark, a Scripturalist, would have wanted him to ask! By basically asking whether Clark can know his apologetic is "Scriptural," Mr. Flood's own apologetic against Clark unwittingly follows Clark's own procedure of grounding apologetics in epistemology.
Mr. Flood also seems to suggest that Clark's belief that epistemology undergirds apologetics falls into the category of the sort of philosophy Paul alludes to in Colossians 2:8. But this appears to be no more than an assertion. Compare this to Clark's exegesis of Colossians 2:8 in his commentary on the book:
Note that the phrase “according to the elements of the cosmos” – better, the first principles of the cosmos – is about instruction, philosophy, traditions, and persuasive paralogisms. Later in the chapter, 2:20-23, he is more specific. These verses concern the “rudiments” – the same word “elements” – of the world. Verse 21 identifies one. It is a maxim or precept. Therefore it is better to understand these worldly elements as being the axioms, presuppositions, or even the main theorems of false religions. Paul doubtless had Judaism in mind, but the exhortation is completely general. (Colossians, 1979)
For my own part, I've explained why I believe apologetics is grounded in epistemology (link). With all of this in mind, Mr. Flood continues to describe how his views have changed over time:
I had naively assumed that it's always appropriate to ask, 'How do you know?' I now hold that 'How do you know?' presupposes answers to more basic questions, such as, 'What kind of world is it such that the quest for knowledge of the truth makes sense to an English-speaker above a certain age with the leisure and interest to ask it?'
Here, Mr. Flood is correct. Questions per se cannot be foundational to a worldview, and everyone has a worldview. That is, everyone has an actual view of the world, not just questions about the world.
For example, people who identify as global skeptics may think they do nothing but question, but their very acts of questioning presuppose a view of the world; that is, they view the world in such a way as to be open to the legitimacy of questioning. This fact enables a Christian apologist to question, for example, how such persons know their view is legitimate. But the Christian apologist is only able to ask this question because his own worldview is able to legitimate the act of questioning the global skeptic.
Clark too recognized that the question "How do you know?" can neither be asked nor answered ad infinitum. Implicit theorization logically precedes questioning. Hence, Clark was a foundationalist about epistemic justification (not, as some have held, a coherentist; link).
These points again show the fundamental priority epistemology has over apologetics. It also shows - in contrast to Clark - how epistemology and metaphysics are, for an apologist, mutually dependent (link). In order for one to know something, there must be some thing to know. On the other hand, an apologist will be unable to defend his metaphysic if he doesn't know anything.
Moving on, perhaps Mr. Flood's most blatant disagreement with Clark is found in the following lines:
The figures we meet in Scripture no more fret about epistemology than they do about eating or sleeping.Knowing, like walking, eating, sleeping, and praying, is something we do spontaneously. We can reflect critically on our knowing, asking what exactly we're doing when we're doing that. To play the skeptic, however, about the deliverances of our senses risks evading responsibility for what we know.
I had to reread these lines a few times. I don't want to misrepresent Mr. Flood, but to the idea that "knowing... is something we do spontaneously" or that Scriptural figures don't "fret about epistemology," I would ask what Mr. Flood makes of the following passages:
Hosea 4:6, 6:6 My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge: because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will also reject thee, that thou shalt be no priest to me: seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, I will also forget thy children... For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.John 17:3 And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.2 Peter 3:18 But grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. To him be glory both now and for ever. Amen.Colossians 1:9-10 For this cause we also, since the day we heard it, do not cease to pray for you, and to desire that ye might be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding; That ye might walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God;
Do none of these statements by Hosea, John, Jesus, Peter, Paul, etc. indicate epistemic concerns? If "Human knowledge does not have to meet the standard of episteme (ἐπιστήμη) as Clark held," surely there must nevertheless be a standard higher than "Adam's knowing Eve"? Do the exhortations and warnings to the audiences of these letters or prayers and desires for them express a hope for spontaneous or conscious, deliberate growth in knowledge? Or take the following passages:
Colossians 2:2-3 That their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgement of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ; In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.2 Timothy 3:14-17 But continue thou in the things which thou hast learned and hast been assured of, knowing of whom thou hast learned them; And that from a child thou hast known the holy scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: That the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.
Hebrews 6:11 And we desire that every one of you do shew the same diligence to the full assurance of hope unto the end:
Is full assurance possible if one does not know that of which one claims to be assured? Can one continue in, show diligence towards, or attain full assurance of understanding without knowing? Do these not suggest believers bear an epistemic responsibility? Indeed, I think a strong case can be made (link) that believers can do more than "inductively derive an epistemology from Scripture," as Mr. Flood puts it.
These texts also mitigate against Mr. Flood's claim that "the quest for certainty is not biblical" but rather "a thoroughly modern enterprise." This is like claiming that the quest for righteousness is not biblical but rather a Pelagian enterprise. Others may try false paths towards becoming certain or righteous. Such should not discourage believers from the true path towards good things.
Now, Clark himself was aware of a range of biblical meanings of the word "knowledge." I've quoted the following several times in other posts:
The various Scriptural usages of the verb know raise a problem in apologetics to which a commentary can only allude in a footnote. The common meaning is exemplified in simple sentences, such, “I know that there is a tree on the lawn,” and “I know that David was King of Israel.” But sometimes, both in Hebrew and in Greek know means believe, obey, choose, have sexual intercourse. English too uses the verb in a variety of meanings. In their opposition to the intellectual emphasis on truth, experiential, emotional, mystical, and neo-orthodox apologetes have contrasted the intellectual Greek meaning with the (sometimes) sexual Hebrew meaning. This contrast is misguided because the Hebrew verb and the Greek verb are both so used. More serious than this linguistic incompetence is a flaw or a gap in the apologetics of these apologetes. It is well enough to point out the extended meanings of the verb. The verb is indeed so used. But such information is irrelevant as an argument against intellectualism and truth. The fallacy or defect is that these apologetes fail to explain knowledge in its basic sense. To insist on extended meanings of knowledge is no substitute for a basic epistemology. Of course, omniscience is a bit hard to come by, but the first and absolutely indispensable step is the definition of terms. (The Pastoral Epistles, 1983, pg. 166)
Was, then, Clark suspect to a "rationalist paradigm of knowledge," as Mr. Flood alleges? Well, I would agree that on some topics, Clark does indeed seem to succumb to rationalistic tendencies. I believe this happened more so in the case of metaphysical subjects than epistemological ones, but as I have said that the two disciplines are mutually dependent, it is unsurprising that a rationalistic tendency on one's views in one subject would impact one's views on the other. Clark's occasionalism is a case in point.
But I can't imagine that Clark would side with the rationalists about whom Mr. Flood writes, "One problem for rationalists (but not only them) is that self-contradiction is problematic only in a completely intelligible universe - which only the believer in the God of the Bible has a warrant for affirming." On the contrary, I think Clark would have pushed Mr. Flood to consider that the believer in the God of the Bible only knows God through the Bible. This shows Clark's anti-rationalism.
Now, one might rightly criticize Clark for having missed a meaning of "knowledge" that falls within the biblical, semantic domain of the word. For example, Mr. Flood, citing Matthew 16:2-3 and Luke 12:54-56, argues that Jesus affirms one's ability to make discernments or know on the basis of inductive inference (if derived by inference, can such knowledge be said to be "spontaneous," though?). Consider the following by Clark:
...it is a truism that a inductive argument cannot yield a conclusion whose truth is formally guaranteed. That is to say there is nothing in the form of the inductive argument whereby it is logically impossible for the conclusions be false if the premises are true. Rather if the inductive arguments can be confidenced at all, they are said to contain premises which support rather than entail their validities.
I can't find a fault in Clark's reasoning here. At the same time, I allow that there is room for discussion about whether beliefs based on induction might count as "knowledge," especially if Scriptural statements give space for such an interpretation. Certain beliefs might be able to be classified as knowledge without being grounded in argumentation which formally guarantees the truth of the conclusion.
Clark's emphasis on a "basic epistemology" is not misplaced, however, for I would and have argued that fallibilist accounts of knowledge can only be defended (apologetically) if grounded in a more "basic epistemology" - like in Scripture itself, to which Mr. Flood himself has been appealing to make his case for other kinds of knowledge (e.g. link, link).
A few more comments Mr. Flood makes are worthy of response:
In human knowing, the physical and the intellectual don't happen to 'come together': they're never apart. They're seamlessly connected. We can distinguish them notionally, but why decouple them? Human insight or intellectual grasp is always into what is given in sensation or the imagination, both of which are brain functions.
This holds for logic and mathematics as for sensory perception. We symbolically express our syllogisms and equations after conjuring them in our imagination (i.e., in our brains).
I wonder whether Mr. Flood believes that humans can learn anything in the intermediate state between death and the parousia. The above would indicate that this is impossible. This would make Abraham's conversation with the rich man in Luke 16 either unintelligible or parabolic, for example.
Of course, I think that when writing the above, Mr. Flood is imagining a more relatable scenario, i.e. embodied human experience. Even so, for some time now, I haven't quite understood in what sense the above or the following are supposed to pose a problem to Clark's basic epistemology (if they are meant to do so):
...when I read the Bible, I get the clear impression that God created us to communicate linguistically, which means interacting and grappling with the world using our bodies' central nervous system and sensory organs...
...the Bible is a body of divine thoughts communicated through symbols, themselves rendered and conveyed physically and therefore temporally...
These sorts of comments anticipate the ever common objection to Scripturalism: don't you have to read your Bible? In accepting occasionalism, I think Clark felt the force of this objection more than he would have cared to admit, tailoring his metaphysical view of causation - occasionalism, at least by the time he wrote Lord God of Truth - to support his anti-empiricism. In my mind, this illustrates Clark behaved as if metaphysics and epistemology were interdependent, even if he insisted the latter was more philosophically basic.
I have already detailed why I think Clark should not have felt pressured by the consideration that sensation might function as secondary causes of our beliefs, for I don't see how such would have affected his "basic epistemology" that knowledge of God's word is foundational for the defense of any other beliefs:
To say some belief can’t be internally justified for no other reason than that it is caused in a certain way is a genetic fallacy. Scripturalists are (or, in my opinion, ought to be) doxastic foundationalists: in short, a belief is philosophically known only if appropriately inferred from other [internally] justified beliefs or if the belief in question is self-justified or self-evident, in which case it is foundational, a first principle, axiom, presupposition, etc. But it doesn’t matter whether such a belief was the result of secondary causation or directly mediated to our minds via divine causation. Ultimately, everything is caused by God. On internalism, the causal origin of the belief doesn’t feature into whether the axiomatic belief itself is self-justified, especially if the resultant epistemic system can provide an account of the means by which we know. (link)
Epistemology has to do with what we think is true - specifically, which thoughts do we say we know are true, and how do we know them? Now, if thoughts are immaterial, mental, or spiritual, to argue against Clark that a material, physical, or sensory process undermines his epistemology begs the question. One must, in providing such an external critique, specify his grounds for regarding a physical process as integral to epistemic justification. That is not Clark's burden of proof to discharge here. In response to, "Don't you have to read your Bible?" Clark is well within his rights to reply, "Well, do you? If so, how, and to what end?" (link)
Note that these points are only meant to pertain to Clark's "basic epistemology," not to extra-biblical beliefs which may be fallibly (and/or externally) justified (even if Clark would not have accepted the possibility of this).
Finally, a fitting close to the review of this chapter will return to the first paragraph, in which Mr. Flood states that "one of the most instructive contrasts [when it comes to defending the Christian faith] is between the apologetical method of Cornelius Van Til... and that of Gordon Clark..." While I have not read the entirety of Mr. Flood's book, we get a sense of his view of the contrast in the following statements:
Van Til suggested discerning "the impossibility of the contrary," that is, the inability of the non-Christian to make sense of sense-making. The issue is the ground of intelligible predication, one Clark never took up. The Van Tilian transcendental argument (TA) attempts to show the exclusive power of the Christian worldview to ground intelligible predication (including that of the TA itself). It requires showing that the God-Men-World relationship in Scripture is alone adequate to that task...Christian as such are not required to 'explain the reductio' or show how secular axioms generate self-contradiction of demonstrate that the Christian system is internally consistent. Even if justified, such a task would be reserved for above-average apologetes confronting above-average unbelievers.
I gather the first paragraph outlines Van Til's apologetic, whereas the second alludes to Clark's. I found it interesting that Mr. Flood seems to consider the first paragraph to be an apologetic methodology for the common man, as if most people know what "intelligible predication" even means. Surely we are far afield of "spontaneous" knowledge mentioned earlier in the chapter! Not that I think is wrong. Apologetic depth is a strength.
Regardless, I have yet to encounter an expression of Van Til's TAG which does not itself presuppose Clark's Scripturalism (link, link). I have never seen a proof, for example, that "the God-Men-World relationship in Scripture is alone adequate" without an appeal to Scripture. All this is to say that while I myself am in favor of transcendental argumentation, I agree with Clark that apologetics is grounded in epistemology - a Scripturalist epistemology, albeit with some modifications to Clark's own views.
I'll plan to review chapter 10 in a separate post.
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