The following are Gordon Clark's personal notes on the Complaint taken from this scan written sometime around 1947. In several places, I have made his shorthand clear for ease of reading.
The word knowledge
The Complaint uses knowledge in the sense of information.
p. 4. col. 3 “man is dependent upon the divine revelation for knowledge of God”
p 4 col. 3 “Only the Son has a knowledge… the Father’s knowledge of the Son… exhaustive knowledge”
obviously not exhaustive mental activity – but exhaustive information
p. 2. col 3. “he has given a knowledge of himself through his works and words”
p. 3 col 1 “the knowledge which God possesses of himself”
“that human knowledge is a knowledge communicated by God”
“man may possess true knowledge”
Cf. bottom of page 35 of 1947 4[?] D Report
N. B.: Complaint p. 5 col. 1. If they refer to distinction of “contents” as possibly quantitative – they must be referring to information.
P 5 col 2. “human knowledge has this propositional character”
Evidently knowledge = information
“knowledge is a matter of propositions.”
“item of knowledge.”
Complaint 5, 3, paragraph 2. Knowledge = information
Five times in one paragraph
We grant the Complaint also intends knowing
But it includes information.
And “any single point” emphasizes this inclusion.
Note also 4 D Report p. 39 – the Son’s knowledge of the Father
this cannot mean the Son’s mental activity of the Father
it must mean – the Son’s information of the Father
and it may be called comprehensive
mental activity is not properly called comprehensive
The distinct meanings of the word knowledge were made clear in The Answer p. 20
N.B. Frank and Wagnalls, Standard Dictionary 1941
“Knowledge: 1 A result or product of knowing; that which is known. Specifically: any fact or truth or the aggregate of facts, truths, and principles known, acquired, or retained by the mind; information…”
Complaint p. 5 col 1
“there is a qualitative distinction between the contents of the knowledge of God and the contents of the knowledge possible to man”
Complaint p. 5 col 2 We may not safely conclude that God’s knowledge is propositional in character [not exact quote]
5/2 “a proposition would have to have the same meaning for man as for God” cf. p 7 c. 3.
#1. Very general and vague statement
3, 4, 5, 9 very specific but not a single point
7, 8, 10 implications
6 analogy, representation
2, 11, 12 propositional truth
13 God is not a Gegenstand
Complaint p. 7 col 3
“the propositions have the same content, mean the same, to God and man.”
This they repudiate; also repudiate on p. 5 col 2
p. 5 col 3 “We dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any singly point”
5/3 our “knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge which God possesses
Dr. Clark’s Theory of Knowledge
p. 4 “Dr. Clark holds that any one proposition can be understood or apprehended apart from implications. But this is impossible. For [If so, we know nothing] if a proposition is not related to implications, it is not known and not possess by a human mind.”
p. 5 “There is no such thing in view. As the known proposition entirely apart from connotations, implications and presuppositions; apart from implications it is never known and never grasped.”
Com. For the Complainants: The Incomprehensibility of God
p. 3 “man may and does know the same truth that is in the divine mind… [Yet when man says that God is eternal he can not possibly have in mind a concept of eternity that is identical or that coincides with God’s own thought of his eternity.”
No concept the same – no point of coincidence
p. 6 “the distinction between knowledge of a truth and knowledge of its implications is artificial and atomistic”
“the human mind can not know it as a bare proposition apart from an actual understanding of implications.
Not by the Complainants
Continuation of Report of committee on True Doctrine
F. H. Klooster: The Incomprehensibility of God
Dissertation: Free University of Amsterdam
p. 121 The quotes from a Report
“It appears a tremendous assumption without warrant from Scripture and fraught with dangerous speculation impinging upon the doctrine of God to aver that all truth in the mind of God is capable of being expressed in propositions.”
p. 129 “the difference between the knowledge of a child and an adult is not simply a difference in the number of propositions known.”
p. 134 “God himself is not a Gegenstand for an analytical activity
Previously he said not a Gegenstand for reuse[?], he also despised [analytical] abstraction; but here God can not be known
Compare with Brunner
I know not It-truth
Kuschke and Bradford
A Reply to Mr Hamilton
P 2. The object of knowledge is truth – one for all knowing minds. But the content of knowledge is a representation of the truth. “The character of the knowing mind itself fixes the character of the content of knowledge.” [the unrighteous does not have the same representation of truth]
P 4. “Regeneration… is not a change in the understanding of these words” is an erroneous view.
p. 6 “When he is regenerated, his understanding the proposition may undergo no change at all… we insist that an unrighteous man may put exactly the same meaning of the words… as the regenerate man” – is Ct. Kuschke takes issue with.
The gospel is foolishness [but they know what it means]
Second reply to Hamilton – by Kuschke
p. 3 and of long paragraph – they object to this : teach a contradictory view
p. 6. They repudiate “The purely intellectual understanding of a proposition may be the same for regenerate and unregenerate.”
p 7. Granted the that God by regeneration enlightens our minds and leads us into more truth. Denied that “David killed Goliath” can not be understood by unregenerate
p. 7 “his understanding is never the same as that of an unregenerate man.” II Cor 4:3-6 refers to items hid i.e. not understood by the unregenerate
Mt. 13:3-22 also refers to items not known… the multitudes no doubt understood the literal meaning of the parable, but what the parable illustrated they did not understand at all.
john 1:17 For the law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.
5:53 Ye have sent unto John, and he hath borne witness unto the truth.
8:32 And ye shall know the truth
Dare anyone say that there is not even a single point of contact between God’s knowledge and ours?
8:45 But because I say the truth, ye belive me not. Which of you convicted me of sin? If I say the truth, why do ye not believe me?
16:7 Nevertheless I tell you the truth
16:13 Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all the truth.
17:17 Sanctify them in the truth; thy word is truth.
Cf. II Cor. 11:10 As the truth of Christ is in me, no man shall stop me of this glorifying in the regions of Achaia.
And also: I Kings 17:24; Psalms 25:5, 43:4, 86:11, 119:43, 142, 151;
Rom. 1:18; 3:7; II Cor. 6:7; 7:14
Gal. 2:5, 14; Eph 1:13
Throughout the history of this case, the difficulty of using terms in a single sense has led to a great deal of confusion. While I have gone to great lengths to define my terms, the Complainants seem always to miss the point. And yet not always. They have on occasion at least, grasped my meaning and have none the less distorted it.
The seriousness of not attending to definition, or of not attending sufficiently, is seen in the case of the word emotion. The Complainants treatment of the question of emotion is extremely revealing.
They wrote several columns opposing my theory of emotion and charged me with error. They allege p 9. col. 3. that my theory of emotion not only does violence to the Scriptural and Reformed doctrine of man’s religious life, but also to the tremendously important doctrine of God’s creation of man in his own image.”
But on p. 13 col. 2. they admit that my doctrine is correct; they admit if the word emotion signifies what I signify by it, my conclusions follow.
That is, they admit that if anyone pays attention to what I say, my meaning will be found correct. And yet they previously charged me with doing violence to Scripture and to the doctrine of creation. How can they make these charges when they know my theory is correct? And how can they circulate these charges throughout the country when they have this knowledge and after it has been explicitly called to their attention?
Note that I explicitly brought this point to their attention on Nov. 20, 1944, before they circulated the Complaint to the public. I said (Protest attached)
In connection with this matter of emotion, kindly compare the charge with what I actually said in the exam.
Complaint: p. 9 col 2 and 3.
Forthright denial of anything that might be called emotion.
Transcription p. 17, 6, 7. God is angry, God loves his people.
Are emotions the only active [principle?]
The evidence thus directly contradicts the charge. It seems strange that anyone should think I deny God is active. My insistence on his will indicates his activity. Is not volition an active principle” or “principle of action.” If will isn’t, what could be?
And to call love a volition is not a new way of speaking, but an old way that seems to have been forgotten. Cf. Augustus Toplady whom the Complainants in a paper try to explain away.
Kant vs. Turretin
They argue: the Bible speaks of love (Second Head p. 4) therefore love is an emotion. This begs the question.
Further on the Emotions. In paper = Second Head p. 7 and 8. Emotions are to be distrusted and suppressed – where did I say this – I said exactly the opposite.
Transcription p. 13, 8-9. Intellect and emotion are equally essential to a human being. How can the Complainants claim I said they should be suppressed. I did say they should be governed by truth which the intellect grasps.
No right or wrong without truth. Attaining truth = intellection. Emotions should be directed by the intellect as it has the truth. This is exactly Calvin’s doctrine and mine and Charles Hodge too.
Report and minority agree with me. All oppose the Complaint.
Another serious defect in the Complaint is found on p. 5. Col 2. Bottom. The phrase in question appears only once in the Complaint but the view it expresses underlies most of the charges of the section.
The Complaint implies that I hold that truth is divorced from the knowing subject, that truth consists of self-contained independent statements.
The knowing subject, of whom truth is independent, I God; since to say that truth is independent of some one man is not to the point.
Thus they charge me, by a clear implication, with holding that truth is independent of God; and this charge seems to underlie a great deal of this section of the Complaint.
Plato in the Timaeus.
In class after class I have distinguished the Platonic from the Christian view – as some of you know.
The Complaint have not and cannot find evidence for their assertion. It is completely baseless.
And the evidence that is found contradicts their charge.
The Platonic view is refuted by
Transcription 14, 15. God is not limited by anything external to him: therefore no independent world of Ideas.
Cf. up[?] same page 14, 20 His knowledge is not limited by anything outside of him.
Another point that underlies so much of the argument relates to my view of truth in general. For me truth is a system of truths. Each truth, i.e. proposition, is distinct, but not independent of every other.
In paper Incomprehensibility p. 6, they say the distinction between knowledge of a truth and knowledge of its implications (i.e. other truths) is artificial and atomistic. Why artificial? All meanings merge. No real or natural distinction.
I do not see anything artificial in distinguishing between 1 David was King and 2 Solomon ordered cedars for the temple. It seems to me that the distinctions between David Solomon and trees are entirely natural distinctions, not artificial. They are related in one system, but they are indeed distinct truths. This has a bearing on the confusion concerning paradoxes and their solution.
It seems to me that the Complainants actually hold, and by their logic ought to hold, that the solution of any paradox requires an exhaustive knowledge of all truth. The distinction between truths is artificial and hence a problem or paradox anywhere requires adjustments throughout all knowledge. I would agree that every truth fits the system, and that if a truth is misplaced (so to speak) or a falsity is inserted, the whole system is disjointed. But I do not hold that the solution of a paradox requires us to know the whole system. A paradox is (by my definition) an apparent contradiction. What appears contradictory to me may not appear to another person. That is to say, a paradox is a psychological problem, it is not a real inconsistency in the system of truth.
To solve a paradox therefore requires only a proof that the 2 truths may be consistent.
The transcription indicates this clearly
Transcription 35, 12ff. The beginner in physics meets a paradox relating to the pressure of water.
This paradox is soon solved. The students do not have to learn all physics. They need only to see that two statements are not contradictory. And though at first the puzzle seems so difficult, its solution is a relatively simple matter of logic and definition. If the solution of a paradox required a complete explanation of all physics or all theology, no man could ever solve a paradox.
I hold that many paradoxes have been solved. Successive generations of students solve the same paradoxes year after year; but still they do not know all about the general subject.
Nor do I claim an exhaustive knowledge. Knowledge when I think I solve a paradox. To show they may be consistent is enough
Another point, very simple, but it has been made to appear complex and difficult.
Complaint p. 6, col 1. “Dr. Clark does not base his doctrine of incomprehensibility upon the distinction between God as infinite and man as finite.”
They refer the Transcription 45:24ff. But the transcription says something quite different from what they say I said next.
They say –
Transcription says – infinity is not a sufficient answer.
“Sufficient” indicates that there is more to the answer – it does not indicate that the factor called insufficient plays not fact at all. A factor that is insufficient is often indispensable.
2.B. Q. Is King George King of England because he is a man?
A, Obviously a woman cannot be king. Hence this is necessary but not sufficient. Also a French or U.S. man could not be King.
Q. Is he King because he is an English man
A. not sufficient – but because he came next in the Royal line.
Now, is God incomprehensible because infinite? This is not a sufficient reason.
The Complaint says I take no account of God’s infinity but the truth shows I do. I do – and add more particular reason. God is infinite in several ways; man is finite in several ways. Now, which of these phases of finitude prevents man from exhaustively knowing God. And my reply is: not because man is finite in space; not because man is finite strength; but because man’s mental constitution is finite by reason of its temporality.
When I say infinity is not a sufficient reason, it is distressing to be understood as saying it is not a necessary reason. And when I say temporality is the particular finitude of man that prevents him from knowing God exhaustively; it is remarkable that I am reported to have said infinitude is not involved at all.
The majority report sees all this with perfect clarity.
p. 7. Paragraph 2.
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