tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post6682040784134693383..comments2024-03-21T03:04:18.673-04:00Comments on Unapologetica: David P. Hoover on Van Tilian Analogical KnowledgeRyanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-62541122591962300842014-03-19T21:11:33.492-04:002014-03-19T21:11:33.492-04:00Or I could write a new post reviewing it, whicheve...Or I could write a new post reviewing it, whichever you prefer.Ryanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-78048810553699708092014-03-19T17:14:38.136-04:002014-03-19T17:14:38.136-04:00Hello again,
Thanks for commenting. I was able to...Hello again,<br /><br />Thanks for commenting. I was able to find your essay online and skim it quickly. I don't want to rush a response, but I think it's only fair to give you some [short] reading material of my own in return so you can anticipate some of my thoughts! On the subject of the necessity of infallibilistic knowledge, see this post (<a href="http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/01/philosophic-knowledge-and-infallibilism.html" rel="nofollow">link</a>). On the necessity of the possibility of self-knowledge, see here (<a href="http://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2013/02/communication-of-first-person-knowledge.html" rel="nofollow">link</a>).<br /><br />Also, if the option to converse over email is still available and your email is still dphoover@centurytel.net, I think it would be better to switch to that mode of communication. If that's okay with you, I'll read your paper more closely and get back to you then and there.Ryanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07883500968749756873noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3295328575953992372.post-3245450738012056592014-03-18T14:58:45.373-04:002014-03-18T14:58:45.373-04:00Hi Ryan!
It's been more than 7 months since m...Hi Ryan!<br /><br />It's been more than 7 months since my response to you last August. Sorry I left the conversation so abruptly. Anyhow, I briefly reviewed what we had talked about and remembered something that had puzzled me earlier. Not sure the best way to put it--it had to do with value you seem to place on Clark's desideratum of refuting skepticism. I understand why my former colleague was so invested that way--though I don't think he even came close to logical success.<br /><br />In epistemology I see two kinds of quests: one positive, the other negative. The positive I see as simply a good theory of knowledge, theory that attempts to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for (personal human) knowledge. The qualifiers within the parentheses are important to me. <br /><br />The negative is a theory of epistemic limits ("theory of ignorance" might say it as well). <br /><br />If you can find the time, you <br />might locate an early essay of mine on the ibri.org website entitled, "Epistemic Bad Faith and Mere Knowledge". You can also buy an e-copy at Amazon for $0.99.<br /><br />One main concern in that essay is whether finite human minds (persons) can "know that they know". I suppose the result of my query is what it means to say we are fallible knowers. But if you should read the essay, keep in mind that I am not a fallibilist in the sense of that designation as applied to the tradition of American Pragmatism. (It's funny but three of my profs at Temple U. were influential philosophers within that tradition.)<br /><br />The "Epistemic Bad Faith" paper, I admit, needs to be rewritten. But I would stand by my analysis of the impossibility of knowing that one knows. That's a phrase much repeated by Francis Schaeffer, but I think it can be shown that first order knowing is the epistemic height for minds of our kind. <br /><br />Need to run. Let me know what you think.<br /><br />David HooverAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com