Contemporary Reformed Reading on Original Sin

In my last two posts, I've touched on original sin (link, link) and my desire to post more on the subject. One reason is that I think the Reformed tradition contains distinctive, right answers to questions this subject naturally raises. But another reason is that I think the contemporary Reformed understanding on the subject is a bit scattered. By that, I mean that there is still an intramural debate going on within the Reformed tradition. And while one of the views on original sin within the tradition appears sound, other views are not only unsound, I think that they are dangerous in that they give opponents to the Reformed tradition ammo in terms of what such views would imply about other theological subjects.

So the point of this post will be a sort of introduction on what direction I would recommend to those within the Reformed faith who are looking for where to begin in their reading on original sin.

George Hutchinson's book on "The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterian Theology" (link) is a great book that overviews different Presbyterian views of and discussions about original sin between roughly 1830 and 1960. This is where I learned of Samuel Baird and his works (link). His views are those with which I most closely align. At the same time, this book also covers other schools of thought so that the careful reader will have a fair grasp of and exposure to various lines of thought by the end of the book. It is an excellent introduction to the topic, although it is quite dense for 125 pages.

To expand on the above, Baird wrote "The Elohim Revealed," wherein he defended what Hutchinson calls a "realist" view of original sin. Baird's position, therefore, is similar to but distinct from that of W. G. T. Shedd. In my opinion, Baird has the more defensible view. Charles Hodge responded to this book by Baird with a review of it, and after Baird wrote a rejoinder to Hodge (see below), Hodge seemingly gave up further response.

Baird and other authors (like Robert Landis, link) pretty much level Hodge's position on original sin, which can be summarized by Hodge's statement that "Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed" (Hodge, Theology, Vol. II, p. 194). That is, Landis, Baird, etc. make a good case that the Reformed tradition held - until Hodge - that Adam's progeny participated in Adam's sin, on which account guilt is imputed to all who are fathered from Adam. Landis has a whole chapter in his book in which he quotes the Reformers on this point of participation.

However, that such is true is not intended to imply that everyone in the Reformed tradition falls into what Hutchinson calls the "Realist School" within Presbyterian views on original sin. That is, not everyone will explain what participation in Adam's sin involves in the same way a "realist" would. I can't be certain why this is, but there is a nominalist, voluntarist streak in some Reformed authors. See Calvin or Gordon Clark on ethics, for example. Or see the widespread rejection of traducianism (which, ironically, Clark ably defends).

At any rate, it is this nomalistic or voluntaristic way of thinking that I alluded to earlier as being dangerously tolerated within the Reformed tradition and which, I hope, is eventually rooted out. Instead, Baird's views on original sin (and, correspondingly, on our justification in Christ) provide a much more defensible and systematic expression of the biblical material. For example, in the rejoinder Baird wrote to Hodge's review of his book "The Elohim Revealed," Baird wrote:

According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him… Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by ‘the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’ the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration…

If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation. But this, according to our reviewer, is “simply a physiological theory,” involving “a mysterious identity,” which he cannot admit. Hence the necessity of ignoring the doctrine, in its relation to justification. (link)

According to Baird (and contrary to Charles Hodge), we are not viewed by God merely as if we are righteous - Roman Catholics or Eastern Orthodox would have an argument against the Reformed position if such a legal fiction were really the case. Rather, we are and are viewed by the Father as really righteous - not because of anything we have done or earned - but because the Spirit has really united us to Christ's person and work. As Paul says, "he who is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit with him" (1 Corinthians 6:17).

Just so, people are born in real unity with the first Adam just as believers are born again in real unity with the last Adam. Following Baird, I think a Reformed anthropology should be worked out along these lines. However, the ontology of our synthetic identity as being persons in Christ after regeneration and conversion is, within the Reformed tradition, either underdeveloped or a discussion of which I am ignorant. I expect that this is due, in part, to the failure of a pervasive acceptance of a realist view of original sin.

Now, with all this being said, another person Hutchinson mentions in his book is Henry Thornwell, a theologian Hutchinson also puts in the "Realist School" (which includes Shedd and Baird). Interestingly, Thornwell wrote a critique of Baird's realism and, perhaps, Thornwell's own former views (link). That is, Hutchinson essentially claims, in his book, that Thornwell started his life by critiquing Baird but "in the end was driven to the Realistic explanation... more in the direction of Baird than of Shedd" (pgs. 62-63 of Hutchinson's book). I, on the other hand, am suggesting the opposite is the case. I think Thornwell held views that had some alignment with the Realist School but then came to criticize Baird when he saw where some of the perceived implications led. I could be wrong about this - it has been a while since I read on the subject - but pages 531-534 here seem to make this case.

Regardless, why I mention this is that if I had to point to one resource that seems to face up to Baird and the implications of his realism as expressed in "The Elohim Revealed" or in his rejoinder to Hodge, it would probably be Thornwell's critique. A healthy dose of perspective is needed to conscientiously affirm a given position. I am not writing this post attempting to hide challenges. That said, I myself still lean towards Baird's view and believe modifications can be made to them to avoid some of Thornwell's criticisms (some of which seem just, others of which perhaps can be responded to on Baird's own grounds). What is needed is frank conversation.

Thus, I'm trying to make some headway towards this development, albeit in a slow and methodical way. To say a little more about this, in addition to the above material I've already mentioned, Oliver Crisp has written a book (link) in which he engages W. G. T. Shedd's thoughts (link). I've been directed to a book in which five views of original sin are debated (link). I'm also reading a book on original sin by Ian McFarland (link) which explains Augustinian views on original sin and in what way such differs, say, from Maximus the Confessor.

As I've been reading on Eastern Orthodoxy anyways (with their heavy reliance on Maximus), I realize how little engagement with them I've seen from a Reformed perspective, which is why I mentioned original sin in my most recent post (link). For all the attention Roman Catholic apologists have received from the Reformed tradition, I think Eastern Orthodox apologists will soon warrant more needed attention and corrective, which requires those in the Reformed faith (like myself) to be more prepared for this possibility. On this note, I highly recommend Steve Hays' stuff on Triablogue, particularly any of his posts responding to Eastern Orthodox apologists like Perry Robinson, Daniel Jones, Jay Dyer, etc.

Finally, one person I have corresponded with about many of these issues regarding original sin is Ken Hamrick, who has commented here and there on this blog and used to have a website. I mention him only because he is as knowledgeable on this subject - especially in terms of historical theology - as I've had the pleasure to talk to (e.g. link, link, link), and he has pointed me in the right direction on many of the points I mention above and elsewhere (see, for example, this discussion on puritanboard).

A Critical Evaluation of Eastern Orthodoxy

I have been reading about Eastern Orthodoxy, and while I was recently visiting Emory's theological library, on a whim, I picked up a journal from 2011 called Greek Orthodox Theological Review. One article in the publication is by Eduard Borysov and entitled, "The Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Pavel Florensky and John Meyendorff: A Critical Examination" (link). In it, he outlines a few 20th century Eastern Orthodox theologians and their understanding of how "mystical union between the transcendent God and creatures" is possible.

While the bulk of the article is expository in nature, the final section ("Critical Evaluation") is one of the more incisive critiques of Eastern Orthodoxy I've read. So I thought to reproduce this section here for any who are interested:

In light of the presented views, the tension between indirect participation in God through his energies that are, at the same time, God himself remains unresolved. There are ambiguities in these ideas on several levels. 

The first ambiguity relates to the issue of the definition of the divine energies and their distinction from essence. How can immanent, known energies of God manifest his unknown transcendent essence? If God is wholly present in his energies, in what way are those energies different from his essence? In other words, if the uncreated energies of God are God himself, how one can equate and at the same time distinguish manifestations of the nature with the nature itself? It is still unclear whether the deified person assumes two natures after union with Christ, that is, the deified human nature and the divine nature by grace. If so, what does it mean to be God by grace, and how is that different from being God by nature? Is it not true that complete participation in God implies the fact that he is no longer unknown to the participant and is not transcendent? If communication between God and man occurs at the level of the external manifestations of their natures, how does this happen? Since deification is an experience of God beyond human reason, emotions, or will, in what way can one claim that he has participated in God and not in some other sort of ecstatic or psychological phenomenon?

If a living essence cannot avoid manifesting itself through energies, they are inseparable. However, the problem of identifying energies with essence is that, in the doctrine of salvation, synergy would not only mean a divine-human energies partnership in salvific activity, but also a union of the natures involved in such synergistic salvation, namely, God and man. One should also take into account the notion of "symbol," which Florensky defined as essence, whose energy is mingled with the energy of the other, higher essence, so that symbol is a reality that is greater than itself." If we apply this analogy to deification, we would have to conclude that the energies of man are mingled with the divine energies. And since we cannot discern God from his energies, because energies are inseparable from the divine essence, then both human and divine essences are mingled as well, and thus are indiscernible. Even if Florensky would say that they are not mingled, they are still indiscernible, which brings in a problem for our understanding of the nature of God. 

The second ambiguity is connected to the language used to define and describe deification. It seems that Florensky follows Maximus the Confessor closely, being at some points very ambiguous about the limitations of theosis. He is not afraid to be misunderstood when he talks about the patristic prohibition against participation in or contemplation of the divine nature. He scarcely mentions the traditional patristic teaching that the deified participates only in the divine energies and never in the divine nature. Another example of ambiguity in Florensky's terminology is the idea of synergy between two essences. He says that the synergy of two essences by means of energies produces something "new" to both participants. That sounds like Eutychianism. 

The third ambiguity is based on the philosophical, mainly Platonic, dichotomy between a generic essence and a particular person. Rakestraw is correct when he points out the inappropriate "emphasis upon humanity, rather than human beings [;] being divinized seems to put the focus more on generic human nature rather than individual men and women." Since, according to Agiorgoussis's comment on Maximus, "will and energy do not belong to the person, but to the nature (essence)" by partaking in the divine energies, one shares in the divine nature, not in the divine person. However, the biblical language of participation and sharing belongs on the plane of persons, not natures. For Paul, Christians are transformed into the image and likeness of Christ, not into his deified human nature. Moreover, to what extent can one speak of essence-transforming in the experience of the deified? How would this person's divine nature be different from the divine nature of God? It is unreasonable to invent different kinds of divine nature, whereby God possesses a higher kind of divinity and man a lower kind. 

There is inconsistency in presenting energies as belonging to essence in the Christological context and also as belonging to persons in the Trinitarian context. Meyendorff says, "Repeatedly in the writings of St. Gregory Palamas one finds the expression that divine energies—or the uncreated light—are 'hypostatic' (ÚTroaxaxiKOv cpcoç) or 'en-hypostatic' (évuTióaxaiov)." Since essence does not in reality exist by itself without a hypostasis, it is logical for Meyendorff to conclude that energies belong to a person. However, this statement would contradict the decisions of the ecumenical councils, which claimed that the Trinity has one essence and thus the same energy shared by the three persons, while Christ has two natures and two energies that belong to one person. 

Finally, inconsistency is present in the ways deification is acquired. The Orthodox representatives are assured of the divine source of the union because the transformation of human nature can happen only as the result of God's gift of grace. At the same time, they agree that participation in the sacraments, virtues, and hesychastic prayer are essential in receiving that grace. Ultimately, synergy of the divine gift and human efforts results in a theoandric metamorphosis of the human partaker.

Borysov's comments stand on their own, but I want to make some follow-up observations. 

1. The article immediately reminded me of similar criticisms of Eastern Orthodoxy provided by Steve Hays (link, link, etc.). I encourage readers to read these and search for other articles by him.

2. Borysov writes the following in the main body of his article:

Palamas's theology of energies, according to Meyendorff, has no philosophical rationale behind it. However, one should not forget that the philosophical notions of hypostasis, nature, and energies played a key role in the Christological controversies and had become the basic principles for Palamas's theology proper as well as his soteriology. God is, by definition, unrelated to and above any essence, hence he is unknown by any essence. (Gregory Palamas, Gregory Palamas: The Triads, § 3.2.24, ed. John Meyendorff, trans. Nicholas Gendle (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983), 95)

If God is unrelated to and above any essence, in what way can humans be images of God?

3. I'm going to highlight one of the more fascinating parts of Borysov's article:

Since essence does not in reality exist by itself without a hypostasis, it is logical for Meyendorff to conclude that energies belong to a person. However, this statement would contradict the decisions of the ecumenical councils, which claimed that the Trinity has one essence and thus the same energy shared by the three persons, while Christ has two natures and two energies that belong to one person.

I imagine Borysove is referring, for example, to the third council of Constantinople:

…as we confess the holy and inseparable Trinity, that is, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, to be of one deity, of one nature and substance or essence, so we will profess also that it has one natural will, power, operation, domination, majesty, potency, and glory…

Consequently, therefore, according to the rule of the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ, she also confesses and preaches that there are in him two natural wills and two natural operations. For if anybody should mean a personal will, when in the holy Trinity there are said to be three Persons, it would be necessary that there should be asserted three personal wills, and three personal operations (which is absurd and truly profane). Since, as the truth of the Christian faith holds, the will is natural, where the one nature of the holy and inseparable Trinity is spoken of, it must be consistently understood that there is one natural will, and one natural operation…

…we confess God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; not three gods, but one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: not a subsistency of three names, but one substance of three subsistences; and of these persons one is the essence, or substance or nature, that is to say one is the godhead, one the eternity, one the power, one the kingdom, one the glory, one the adoration, one the essential will and operation of the same Holy and inseparable Trinity, which has created all things, has made disposition of them, and still contains them. (link)

To summarize, Borysov's initial point seems to be that the divine essence doesn't exist or subsist apart from the persons of the Trinity. Therefore, the persons of the Trinity are who will, think, choose, operate, etc., for "energies belong to a person." If I am understanding him correctly, this makes sense to me, for I myself have argued for a long time that the persons of the Trinity are not (contrary to, say, absolute divine simplicity) identical to their acts of will, thoughts, choices, operations, etc. To all appearances, such would lead to modal (and, seemingly, hypostatic) collapse.

Borysov's initial point also reminded me of the following comment by Joseph Farrell who, I recall, used to be cited as a go-to theologian by Eastern Orthodox apologists (I'm not sure if this is the case any more since he deconverted): "there must be in each case a unique enhypostatization of the will in the person, each free to do with the natural will and its objects of choice what he sees fit" (Free Choice in Maximus the Confessor, pg. 189, link).

While it is true that, in context, Farrell is referring to human persons, insofar as there is an admitted analogy between Trinity, Christology, and anthropology, Farrell's above statement seems to agree with Borysov that "energies belong to a person," for then each person of the Trinity would have "a unique enhypostatization of the [divine] will in the person."

Now, I understand the argument against grounding "the will" in persons or hypostases, for that would either lead to either Monothelitism (Christ only has one will because He is one person) or Nestorianism (Christ has two wills because He is two persons). Both of these positions are false, so "the will" shouldn't be grounded in the individual or subject but rather his nature(s). The one Christ has two natures and, therefore, two wills.

We must be careful to strike a balance here, however, for to say the will is grounded in nature does not mean that people who have the same nature make the same choices. My actual choices are not your actual choices, for even though we have the same nature, "there must be in each case a unique enhypostatization of the will in the person," "energies belong to a person," etc. You and I are consubstantial, but the actual choices you and I make are particular to us as different persons or hypostases. In short, I think that to understand this is to understand the difference between numeric and generic unity which I have attempted to explain in several other places (link, link). 

[Parenthetical: it bears repeated emphasis that one really needs to be careful to strike a balance here. While Borysov does not mention original sin and I do not want to stray too far from the point I am attempting to make, what I have said above does not entail that the Reformed understanding of original sin is false. Nothing I have said implies that only actual choices are sinful, that one cannot participate in the sins of one's forefather[s] (even though actual choices are made by persons), etc. While such Reformed views would require a nuanced defense (e.g. of traducianism), Eastern Orthodox apologists are too hasty if and when they suggest the Reformed understanding of original sin implies nominalism and so forth.

While I am on the subject of Eastern Orthodoxy and original sin, their own synods affirm that infants are subject to eternal punishment: 

We believe Holy Baptism, which was instituted by the Lord, and is conferred in the name of the Holy Trinity, to be of the highest necessity. For without it none is able to be saved, as the Lord says, “Whoever is not born of water and of the Spirit, shall in no way enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens.” {John 3:5} And, therefore, baptism is necessary even for infants, since they also are subject to original sin, and without Baptism are not able to obtain its remission. Which the Lord showed when he said, not of some only, but simply and absolutely, “Whoever is not born [again],” which is the same as saying, “All that after the coming of Christ the Savior would enter into the Kingdom of the Heavens must be regenerated.” And since infants are men, and as such need salvation, needing salvation they need also Baptism. And those that are not regenerated, since they have not received the remission of hereditary sin, are, of necessity, subject to eternal punishment, and consequently cannot without Baptism be saved. So that even infants should, of necessity, be baptized. Moreover, infants are saved, as is said in Matthew; {Matthew 19:12} but he that is not baptized is not saved. And consequently even infants must of necessity be baptized. (The Confession of Dositheus, Decree 16)

Since Eastern Orthodoxy rejects the Reformed understanding of original sin, their apologists have a challenge in accounting for this.]

Returning to my former line of thought, this is one reason I am inclined toward the view, for example, that the Father, Son, and Spirit have distinct thoughts. If they are distinct hypostases or persons or subjects or individuals, then we would expect that each would refer to Himself using reflexive indexicals and would not do the same when referring to the other persons. And, indeed, this is what we see in Scripture (e.g. John 17, in which the Son prays to His Father using first person pronouns for Himself and second person pronouns for the distinct person of the Father to whom He is praying). 

Of course, I affirm each Trinitarian person is omniscient. The propositional knowledge they share is common, but the mode in which each person would affirm this knowledge (e.g. of the economic activity of the Trinity, although the same could be applied to their intra-Trinitarian relationships, such as they are) cannot seemingly be the same without collapsing the three persons into one. That is, only the Son can think, for example, "I became man." 

Analogously, each Trinitarian person would also seem to have a different mode of will. While this mode of will would not be what Eastern Orthodox refer to as "gnomic," nevertheless, only the Son could truly affirm (because it corresponds to the enhypostatized, willed reality), "I became man," whereas only the Father can truly affirm, with respect to the Son, that "I sent you" (because it corresponds to the enhypostatized, willed reality), etc. 

This also coheres well, for example, with the Reformed idea of a covenant of redemption. The Father and Son agree (which language already suggests "unique enhypostatization[s]" of the natural, divine will that each Trinitarian person has) about how to act to redeem the elect. The nature of the Trinitarian persons would entail that they necessarily and conjointly agree about what free choice[s] they make - for our creation, let alone our redemption, was not necessitated or obligated - but [their roles in] said choice[s] require distinction.

I will leave aside the question (as interesting as it is) about whether this has implications regarding historical councils. Rather, an ironic point I think Borysov underscores is that the above may be underemphasized in Eastern Orthodoxy, apologists of which make a big deal about absolute divine simplicity (as if Reformed theologians have universally affirmed this; they have not, link). 

That is, just as Eastern Orthodoxy argues against identification of the divine attributes, so too they ought to be careful to avoid identification of the modes of thought and will of each divine person. But this is a danger if Eastern Orthodoxy rejects (for whatever reason - adherence to historical councils or otherwise) "generic unity" by taking consubstantiality to mean that the Trinitarian persons share the "same energy" - as if such energy does not belong to persons, as if the divine will or nature is not enhypostatized a la Farrell, as if reflexive thoughts of members of the Trinity collapse into a singular referent, etc. 

Perhaps such dangers are not a necessary consequence of Eastern Orthodoxy (despite that Borysov seems to think so). Naturally, this discussion could beg a host of other questions, and I don't intend to address all of them (e.g. further nuances of the Eastern Orthodox view of an essence and energies distinction). The main point is that if or when I have said anything in the past about there being three wills or minds among the members of the Trinity, I have not meant to suggest that three wills or minds are suggestive of distinct natures or that "the will" is grounded in hypostases; rather, the language I have been trying to convey is of unique enhypostatizations of the same, generic nature (in which "the [divine] will" is located) by which we call the distinct persons consubstantial. This seems to be a more precise formulation.

I think (although I could be wrong) that this is also what Ian McFarland is getting at when he discusses Maximus the Confessor:

...one of Maximus' chief arguments against the Monothelites was that their association of will with hypostasis led to the unacceptable conclusion that there were three wills in God. As one nature, God has one will. If follows that what God wills, God wills naturally. Maximus takes it as self-evident that such a conception of willing does not amount to a form of necessitarianism; moreover, it remains internally differentiated by virtue of its enactment in and through the three hypostases... (link)

See also footnote 68, wherein McFarland cites Maximus as writing, "For [Christ] came with the good pleasure of the Father and the co-operation of the Spirit" (Opuscule 7). This language too implies that the energies of the persons are distinct precisely because, as has been said several times now, "energies belong to a person." The Trinitarian persons necessarily co-operate, for there is more than one person and, thus, more than one person's energy or energies in question.

Anyways, the point I am making about generic unity and distinction in choice, thought, etc. wouldn't, I think, be all that controversial when applied to men. To the degree one takes issue with a Trinitarian-Christological-anthropological analogy, then, he would have to explain what is relevantly different about the Trinitarian situation (i.e. something more than just pointing out that the consubstantiality of the Trinity entails that they necessarily work towards the same end; such a point does not address the examples of unique thoughts or choices each person has). This, though, I gather that this is precisely what an Eastern Orthodox apologist would wish to avoid.